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Abstract Agricultural technologies are vital for farmers adapting to climate change. However, while efforts have focused on improving access and initial adoption, little attention has been given to social disparities in rates of adoption and the benefits derived from these technologies. Our study investigates the adoption of groundwater irrigation technology in India, a transformative innovation that has historically enhanced productivity and food security, and helped agricultural households adapt to a changing climate. We use a nationwide household survey sample that spans nearly a decade, capturing a key period of groundwater expansion in India. Our analysis reveals that members of highly marginalized social groups are less likely to adopt groundwater irrigation technologies, and less likely to sustain their use of the technologies for long periods of time. Furthermore, the household-level benefits of the technologies–operationalized through the relationship between technology adoption and income–appear lower for households belonging to historically marginalized groups compared to the historically advantaged. Our study underscores the importance of addressing social inequalities in both adoption as well as the sustained utilization of agricultural technologies and other climate adaptation tools. Disparities in the utilization of these technologies can hinder farmers’ ability to access new innovations and adapt to increasing threats from climate change. Targeted policies and interventions are essential to not only provide historically marginalized groups access to technological innovations, but also facilitate their effective utilization. 

ABSTRACT Incentives are a widely used tool for addressing deforestation and are often implemented as collective contracts. Local institutions are crucial to the solution of collective action problems associated with forest conservation, but we still have little knowledge of how to encourage institutional creation through policy. Since collective contracts do not eliminate freeriding incentives, we argue that their success hinges on their ability to stimulate the creation of institutions for collective action. To test these ideas, we analyze data from an incentivized lab‐in‐the‐field experimental collective action game played with natural resource users in four developing countries. The experiment simulates management of a common forest, and groups were randomly assigned to a conservation incentive payment condition. We observe how much group members attempt to coordinate on the creation of institutional rules and find experimental evidence that an external incentive program can stimulate the endogenous creation of informal institutions.